Taking Control

Summary

My report deals with important issues that need to be addressed by both the Federal Government and the Canadian Wheat Board. The CWB issue deals with the fundamental right of equality in our country. To force producers in one area of Canada to deal with the CWB if they wish to export their wheat and malt barley, while allowing producers in other areas of Canada their freedom, is not right. There is also a great deal of controversy on the issue of who actually runs the CWB: the board of directors or the Federal Government. The 2001 Public Accounts of Canada states, while discussing Enterprise Crown Corporations; “There is also a number of self sustaining government business enterprises that are not considered Crown Corporations within the meaning of the Financial Administration Act, but which are owned or controlled by the Government and ultimately accountable to Parliament through a Minister of the Crown for the conduct of their affairs. These are referred to as “other government business enterprises” and includes the Canadian Wheat Board and the various Port Authorities.”….. The federal government plays a much larger role in the activities of the CWB than most people are aware of. I hope that the farming community will benefit from the information put forward in this report and that they follow up on the issues by using the sources that I have made available to them.

Taking Control of Your Future

For the past few years farming has been less than rewarding and trying to find the answers to many of the problems we face is extremely difficult. Talking to and lobbying the government for assistance is fine as far as it goes but we seem to have come to a stalemate with no solutions on the horizon. With this in mind I have decided to take it onto myself to find some new information to work with and to share with others. My goal is to put out a series of articles concerning the farm economy, with the first being the CWB. I have spent the better part of a year researching the CWB annual reports, the Treasury Board Estimates, Public Accounts of Canada and the Reports of the Auditor General of Canada. Most of the information that I have put in this report comes from these sources. My articles will be meant to educate, but mostly to show you where to find the information that you need to make your own informed decisions on all of the important issues. Every fact that I present to you will be backed up with the opportunity to check for yourself the validity of my work. I think this is incredibly important in this day and age where people report news that is less than accurate! I have also included some of my own opinions and conclusions but you would be advised to use your own judgment on these issues. I hope that after people read my report that they follow up on this information.

The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) receives grain from Canadian farmers, pays them an initial price on delivery and sells the grain on the world market. Under the CWB Act, any profit on operations is distributed to farmers, with any loss being absorbed by the government. The terms of sales generally specify cash on delivery. However, credit sales are also made, but only with the concurrence of the government and within guidelines it, (the Government) has established. This area of my report will deal mainly with credit grain sales of the CWB, the role that the government plays in the credit sales, CWB accounting practices and the impact that the Paris Club reschedulings have on the farmers and the Canadian Taxpayer.

Canada extends credit to individual sovereign states for many reasons: to promote development, to support foreign policy objectives and to facilitate export trade. When the Canadian Wheat Board makes a credit sale it borrows the money for the sale and puts that money into the appropriate pool accounts for the farmers. For the most part the objective of the CWB is straightforward and easy to understand but when you dig deeper into the accounting practices it gets confusing. This is how it is done. To work out the net interest that is returned to the farmers, the CWB takes the total amount of interest due from the credit grain sales (as opposed to what is actually received), subtracts the total interest paid on the borrowings and comes up with a positive amount which is paid into the pooled accounts. Interest that is due from the Credit Grain Sales program is shown in the Canadian Wheat Board books as paid, even when payments are not received. The Board assumes that because the money is government guaranteed that they (the CWB) can consider it paid even though payment may not be received for years or possibly not at all. This method is a definite advantage to farmers but unfortunately it also distorts the reality of what is happening with our credit grain sales. The benefit to farmers from this accounting practice of the CWB only amounts to a small amount per farmer per year (about $500) but the burden on taxpayers (which the farmers are as well) is in the billions and will go considerably higher if policy continues as it has in the past. Shortfalls of principal and interest are charged back to the debtor country and added to their existing line of credit. This credit can then be extended to accommodate the increase in debt, rescheduled over a longer period of time or eventually forgiven by the Canadian Government. This system can go on indefinitely.

Another accounting practice that has to be looked into is the way the numbers are handled in the Statement of Operations of the Pool Accounts. This again involves netted out numbers that do not show the real picture. This confusion is compounded by the placement of revenue into operating costs to make the operating costs look smaller. Actual interest earnings from Credit Grain Sales, Government Guarantees, Investments, Despatch earnings and positive freight rate changes belong in revenue not as a netted out number in Operating Costs. As most people know, the way numbers are handled in your bookkeeping can vastly change the way things appear as an end product. I have included with this report a spreadsheet showing how the operating costs per bushel of grain can vary dramatically when numbers are manipulated by different accounting practices. (A) is the way the CWB handles it. (B) is done with actual amounts (not netted out numbers) given to each entry, and with revenue placed where it belongs. The difference it makes in the operating cost per bushel of grain will surprise you!

The CWB finances their credit export sales to sovereign states by borrowing domestically and internationally using the Government of Canada as guarantor. As the government guarantees this borrowing, in effect it assumes the risks and the resultant cost if a sovereign state is unable to pay or if it delays repayment of loans to the corporation. Because the CWB has no other significant assets, repayment of its borrowings depends entirely on receipt of payment for its credit sales. This last statement is significant because as of the early 1980’s, countries that the credit sales were made to, were starting to have trouble keeping up the payments on their debts. This is why you do not see the borrowings decreasing. On the 31 of March 1988, the CWB was owed approximately $3.2 billion in accounts receivable from countries experiencing difficulties in repaying their debts. Included in this figure is about $1.3 billion of interest that CWB has charged the countries. More than one half of this accrued interest had been converted to new principal by the CWB at the direction of the government. In 1989 the Auditor Generals report said “ The Wheat Board's receivables and the accrued interest on them have grown over the years to a very large sum that continues to grow at a rate of several hundred million dollars a year.” In the 1999-2000 annual report the borrowings to accommodate these receivables reached 7.2 billion dollars and will go even higher next year. How high will it be allowed to go before farmers and taxpayers say enough? Remember, any money paid by the Canadian Government on behalf of other countries as debt reduction or forgiveness is ultimately paid for by the Canadian taxpayer. The accounting policy of the Canadian Government stated that if borrowings exceeded a corporations ability to repay, a liability is recorded by the government. The purpose of this policy is to recognize borrowings that the government will likely have to repay. However application of this accounting policy does not permit the risks associated with the CWB borrowings to be recognized, because the countries that owe money to the CWB have not formally repudiated their debts.

This means that each time a sovereign debt is deemed non-performing the principal and interest can be rescheduled and no payment has to be paid by the government of Canada to the CWB until the particular country admits to default. Unfortunately formal repudiation of debts by debtor countries very seldom happens because why would they repudiate their debts when a rescheduling agreement can be obtained that spreads out loan payments over an extended period and sometimes includes a grace period of several years. The CWB and the Export Development Corporation (EDC) are the two main corporations used by the Canadian government to provide the credit debt relief  agreed to at the Paris Club.

Now I would like to give you some background on the Paris Club. When a country finds itself in financial difficulty, it can seek to have its debts to sovereign states rescheduled through the Paris Club, the forum for rescheduling (restructuring) sovereign debt. The Paris Club, of which Canada is a member, is the group of creditor countries involved in these reschedulings. The Paris Club's policies are often influenced by the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries  (U.S., Japan, U.K., Germany, France, Italy and Canada). Before a country can apply for debt rescheduling, the Paris Club requires that a country have in place an economic reform program that is supported by the International Monetary Fund. Since it started in 1956, the Paris Club has always sought to preserve the value of sovereign loans when it reschedules them. Most reschedulings offer a grace period on principal repayments, with interest at market rates, thereby maintaining the present value of the loan. It was assumed that deferring repayment helps a debtor country by allowing time for development activities and for economic programs supported by the International Monetary Fund to bring the country back to a point where it can again service its debt.

In 1990 the government, anticipating debt relief initiatives, voluntarily set up an allowance in its financial statements "... in respect of potential debt relief or debt service relief measures for financially troubled countries under multilateral agreements." The Report of the Auditor General states; “In our view, the establishment of this allowance was, in effect, a recognition by the government that there are risks and potential reductions in the value of certain loans.” This meant that the government knew early on that some of the countries involved were a bad risk and set up a contingent liability fund in its financial statements to cover the possibility of default.

Rescheduling the debts owed to Canada by Poland and Egypt

According to the Department of Finance, in 1991, for geopolitical (as opposed to financial) reasons, the international creditor community through the Paris Club decided to embark on a process of voluntary debt relief for Poland and Egypt. The Department also advised them that this was an exceptional case. As its share of the undertaking, the Canadian government agreed to provide 50 percent debt relief on a present-value basis to Poland and Egypt, provided those countries meet the International Monetary Fund's targets for economic reform. Poland owed the Export Development Corporation and the Canadian Wheat Board approximately $3.5 billion, of which over $2 billion was unpaid interest; Egypt owed them $540 million. In addition, debt relief involving relatively small amounts had previously been offered to the world's poorest countries. The report goes on to say, that debt relief to Poland and Egypt could cost Canadians over $3 billion in the next two decades. On behalf of Poland and Egypt, the Canadian government was paying EDC and the Canadian Wheat Board a portion of the interest payments due from those countries. This would reduce Poland’s and Egypt's debts by half of their present value. Specifically, the government would pay a portion of the interest payments due for the 18 years of the agreement with Poland, and for 25 years in the case of Egypt. The Department of Finance had estimated that this would cost the government about $800 million over the first three years beginning in 1991, and $3.1 billion in total. Shortly after that the Department of Finance decided to switch from debt service relief to debt relief (forgiveness of principal and interest) for Poland and Egypt and certain other debtors. This took place starting in 1991 and has continued up to the present day. The government has paid the CWB in combined principal and interest payments:

  • 1991   $108,693,789.58
  • 1992   $179,807,434.74
  • 1993   $137,890,570.15
  • 1994   $  61,910,971.09
  • 1995   $347,470,682.14
  • 1996   $236,155,481.58
  • 1997   $172,710,284.02
  • 1998   $170,613,253.03
  • 1999   $174,947,343.52
  • 2000   $176,471,310.63

These numbers show the amounts paid by the Government of Canada to the CWB in the calendar years from 1991-2000 in respect of Paris Club and/or Canadian Debt Initiative debt reduction. Please note that these payments are only a small part of the interest and principal due to the CWB for the credit sales. The numbers shown in the annual reports represents net interest on borrowings and credit grain sales, which has a tendency to disguise the actual facts. What farmers need to see is the total cost of the borrowings of the CWB as well as the actual (as apposed to the fictional) cost of the interest received from its credit grain sales. The interesting thing to point out here is that the Credit Grain Sales Program only makes up about 5-15% of the CWB’s yearly business sales but it accounts for most of its borrowings. This definitely has to be looked into. In the 2000 annual report of the CWB they list their borrowings at $7,264,209,000 and their credit grain sales at $7,206,991,000 which is scary considering that a great deal of their “assets” are really bad debts. A person has to wonder if it is time for the CWB to cut its losses and simplify the operation by eliminating the Credit Sales Programs and going to a cash basis. This would cut back on approximately 10% of the yearly grain sales through the board but it would eliminate further credit debt. In 1995 the CWB started doing credit sales outside of the Credit Grains Sales Program. This new program is called the Agri-Food Credit Facility. The borrowings for Agri-Food Credit sales are starting to increase. These sales hold considerably more risk for the CWB because they are only backed to 98% by the government. Two percent  may seem small at first glance, but if the Agri-Food Credit Sales increase at the same rate as the Credit Grain Sales Program, the CWB would be responsible for millions of dollars in interest that will come directly out of the pool accounts if default took place. A good portion of countries involved with the credit grain sales of the CWB are countries that have been to the Paris Club to have their debts rescheduled. Please check out the Paris Club website (www.clubdeparis.org) for a complete list of  countries involved in the Paris Club reschedulings. The decision to extend credit to a country is complex and entails consideration of a number of factors, including those related to foreign and domestic policy, such as the promotion of Canadian agriculture. The extension of credit to the former Soviet Union, and the subsequent decision to temporarily halt grain shipments to Russia, illustrates the range of issues and the complexity associated with such decisions. Credit limits for the Canadian Wheat Board are set by the government, after taking into account the advice provided by the Department of Finance and others. Credit limits to certain debtors have, on occasion, been increased by the government, not due to increased creditworthiness of the country but to accommodate accumulating unpaid interest. Please note that it is the government that makes these important financial decisions. This makes a person wonder if the Government is using their best judgment in these particular business matters. The CWB should not be used as a government tool for foreign affairs. This is bound to increase administration costs to the Board.

I have come across interesting and somewhat confusing information in the Public Accounts of Canada that I questioned immediately. It was “the borrowings from other sources” by the CWB that was stated in the Public Accounts. The amounts were incredible! Yearly borrowings went from $184 Billion in 1997-98; down to $48 Billion in 1998-99; and back up to $85 Billion in 1999-2000. This is quite a variation per year and also a great deal of money for a corporation whose average sales total $4.3 billion per year for the three year period. Credit Grain Sales only account for 5-15% of the total yearly sales, so why would their borrowings need to be that high? A director of the CWB stated in a letter to the editor of our local paper that “This amount simply reflects the numerous rollovers of funds required to meet the Canadian Wheat Board’s short term cash needs as well as to capitalize on opportunities to maximize farmers returns”. In 1991 the total borrowings of the CWB shown in the Public Accounts were $21 billion, they were handling 31,197,242 tonnes of grain with a sales value of $3.5 billion dollars. In 2000 the total borrowings were $85 billion, they were handling 23,628,850 tonnes of grain with a sales value of $4.5 billion. When I look at 1991 and see that it only took $21 billion dollars in rolled over funds to meet the CWB’s short term cash needs and capitalize on the opportunities to maximize farmers returns when they handled 31,197,242 tonnes of grain and yet in 2000 it took $85 billion dollars to do the same job when they only handled 23,628,850 tonnes of grain. I have to wonder why the “short term cash needs of the CWB” that the Wheat Board director refers to, have risen so drastically over the years. Does this reflect a dramatic increase in operating costs or other expenses of the CWB? If not, what is the need for this increase in short term funding? Sales of grain on credit only amount to approximately 5-15% of all grain marketed by the CWB on a yearly basis but in 1991 credit grain sales accounted for a whopping 30% of total sales. In spite of this the borrowings in 1991 remained low. More believable answers are needed in this area.

In a report put out by the Federal Government, it stated that in the fall of 1998 Canada became a leading voice in calling for HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) reforms. On March 25 1999, Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced the Canadian proposals to enhance debt relief and, in so doing, Canada emerged as a leader among the G-7 on the debt issue. Moreover Canada pledged to provide 100-per-cent debt relief to the poorest countries. The February 2000 budget expanded the 100-per-cent debt forgiveness to all eligible HIPCs that are making a real effort to improve the well being of their citizens. On January 1 2001, Canada stopped collecting debt payments from 11 reforming countries and pledged to put in place a debt moratorium for the remaining six countries once they are committed to the principles of peace and good governance. Most of Canada’s credit debt forgiveness is given through the Export Development Corporation (EDC) and the Canadian Wheat Board. Remember that the Canadian Wheat Board is not a voluntary organization. It seems to me that the Government of Canada, through the CWB, is keeping a guaranteed supply of credit grain sales to offer up to the G-7 as proof of their commitment to reduce poverty and satisfy their obligations to the Enhanced HIPC Debt Initiative.

To achieve their mandate, which is to market Western Canadian grain, the CWB cannot be involved with the politics of the Government of Canada. Debt reduction and poverty commitments to foreign countries are not the responsibility of the CWB or the individual Western Canadian farmers. The Federal Government seems to have a deep pocket where foreign aid is concerned but the plight of the Canadian family farm is all but ignored. If the government has the money to reduce and/or forgive billions of dollars in debt to other countries perhaps it should be trying a little harder to help the farmers at home. As long as Canadian farmers have nowhere to turn to make a decent living, they will look for someone to blame for their problems. Unfortunately the Canadian Wheat Board bears the brunt of the anger and mistrust. The federal government has the resources and plenty of room in their domestic subsidies commitment levels, under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture to vastly improve safety net programs without penalty. The only thing missing is the resolve.

I hope this will provide “food for thought” and the tools for everyone to access the information necessary to keep you current on the issues important to you. Being more informed and taking an active role in molding our future is the only positive way we will be able to influence what is taking place around us. Please feel free to e-mail me with any questions or if you need help accessing information.

Sources:

  • 1988 Report of the Auditor General - Chapter 2 - Observations by the Auditor General on Financial Statements & Public Accounts
  • 1992 Report of the Auditor General - Chapter 10 - Loans to Sovereign States
  • 1989 Report of the Auditor General  - Chapter 4 - Audit Notes
  • Department of Finance
  • Public Accounts of Canada 1999-2000 Volume I Summary Report & Financial Statements   Section 9.7 Enterprise Crown Corporations
  • Report on Operations Under the Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act: 3 Joint Issues - Multilateral Debt Relief....  Found on the Dept of Finance Web site

Websites:

Please note that the figures in red represent netted out figures (positive earnings) that belong in revenue.  These positive earnings are placed in the CWB operating costs to make their operating expenses seem smaller.  Rate per tonne is worked out by dividing $ amounts by receipts from producers in tonnes e.g. $181,224,000.00 divided  by 23,628,850 = $7.67 per tonne.  This is converted to cost per bushel by dividing $7.67 (cost per tonne) by 36.744 (conversion for wheat) which equals $0.21.

Please note that these are not actual figures.  The positive $ values are kept true, but the $ amounts given to the items with the * beside them are hypothetical.  I have asked for the breakdown amounts from the CWB but I have not yet received them.  This comparison was done to show how easily the figures can be manipulated depending on where they are placed, and if they show actual costs or just netted out values.

 

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